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American Political Science Review
a decline in civic activism, and a breakdown of the socialsupport mechanisms that had been one of the strengths of
the Soviet system.
The blame for this turn of events is placed primarily
on Yeltsin and his chief political and economic advisers.
Western leaders, the International Monetary Fund, and particularly Western economists are also accused of encouraging Russian leaders to follow an inhumane set of policies.
The overall reform strategy, generally in line with what
has come to be known as the Washington Consensus or
"shock therapy," emphasized monetarist approaches, price
deregulation, rapid privatization of industry, and the end of
government-provided subsidies and social safety nets. One of
the most important contributions of the book is its explication
of the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that produced
the reform strategy. Especially useful are the insights on the
various protoparties and political movements that struggled
to establish a political foothold in the chaotic developments of
the period. Reddaway and Glinski coin the term "market bolshevism" to describe the political mindset of the winners-the
political figures such as Anatoly Chubais who implemented
shock therapy-a disregard for public opinion and a manipulative approach that manufactured mass support only when
absolutely necessary, as during Yeltsin's bid for reelection in
1996.
This is a book that provides an overabundance of detail, and
almost no evidence relevant to its main thesis is overlooked.
Some of the evidence that contradicts the thesis is perhaps
dismissed too readily, however. The authors view the period
of shock therapy as having lasted seven years, rejecting arguments by reform defenders that the Yeltsin government
quickly backtracked and that compromises made because
of political weakness undermined the foundations of many
of the reforms. Instead, Reddaway and Glinski present this
"seesaw" approach as the intended strategy. Further, a number of phenomena-such as the rise of criminal mafias-that
were presumably unanticipated consequences of the policy
choices made are presented as if they were part and parcel of
the reformers' strategy.
The authors present alternative paths as real options, although they seem beyond what was possible in Russia at the
end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s. Popular discontenta "grassroots anti-nomenklatura upsurge" (p. 253)-that supposedly could have been mobilized into a movement in
support of another kind of reform did not appear to have
the kind of usable potential that the authors suggest. In
order to tap this presumed source of support, the authors
argue that Yeltsin should have relied more on the nascent
democratic movement. In particular, they favor the nationaldemocratic wing, such political figures as Sergei Baburin
and Oleg Rumiantsev. In the early 1990s, these figures were
marginalized politically, and they joined the opposition that
conspired to seize power in October 1993. Reddaway and
Glinski also side with opposition economists such as Sergei
Glaziev, who has long advocated an economic strategy based
on government support of key industries and strong social
programs for the victims of reforms.
There is an unfortunate tendency in some of the analysis
to relay as evidence conjecture and conspiracy theories that
figure so prominently in the Russian media. For example, the
shortages of consumer goods in the late Soviet period are
viewed not as evidence of the collapse of the previous system
but as a pressure tactic by wholesale traders to wrest control
from the state over this sector. In discussing the events of
October 1993, when the anti-Yeltsin opposition in parliament
launched a violent attempt to seize the mayor's office, television facilities, and other centers of power, the authors use
speculative and dubious accounts to suggest that the violence
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was deliberately facilitated by Yeltsin's security forces. The
goal was to justify the later use of tanks against the parliament
in support of Yeltsin's ultimate purpose, "the destruction of
Russia's parliamentarism for the sake of increasing his personal power" (p. 429). The authors find it plausible that the
1999 incursion by Chechen rebels in Dagestan was provoked
by the Russian security forces (headed at the time by Vladimir
Putin) in order to provide an excuse to start a new war in
Chechnya.
Overall, though, despite its weaknesses and occasional
lapses, Reddaway and Glinski's account provides an extraordinary wealth of information on the twists and turns of
Russian politics during this formative period.
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Benjamin Reilly makes an important contribution to the
debate on the appropriate institutional design of electoral
systems for mitigating conflict and sustaining democracy in
ethnically plural societies. The dominant position in this debate posits the importance of proportional representation
(PR) systems. An alternative position, less widely accepted
largely because of an ostensible absence of empirical examples, posits the importance of majoritarian preferential systems that encourage cross-ethnic vote pooling. Reilly extends
this debate by drawing on heretofore unknown or understudied cases to examine the operation of both majoritarian (the
alternative vote or AV and the supplementary vote or SV) and
proportional (single-transferable vote or STV) preferential
systems in different social contexts and in different elections
(legislative and presidential).
The book's central argument is that, unlike the elite-based
PR systems, preferential systems privilege the decisions of
voters as the source of cross-ethnic vote swapping, forcing
otherwise rational candidates to forgo ethnic outbidding in
favor of seeking votes across ethnic cleavages. The argument
turns on the notion of "centripetalism," which, for Reilly,
refers to a "normative theory of institutional design" that
seeks to 1) create electoral incentives for politicians to campaign for votes across ethnic cleavages, 2) establish arenas
of bargaining for ethnic elites to transfer the lessons from
electoral bargains to other political issues, and 3) foster centrist and aggregative multiethnic political parties instead of
extremist and exclusively ethnic ones (p. 11).
Eschewing systematic theory testing, Reilly uses this normative theory as a loose framework to evaluate the performance of preferential systems in all cases (except Malta) that
are known to have utilized them. Bracketing the case studies
are an informative overview of the development of preferential voting systems from their origins in attempts in the
nineteenth century to overcome the intrinsic weaknesses of
majority runoff elections (Chapter 2) and a useful discussion
of the technical variations in the institutional designs of such
systems that also highlights the unexpected consequences
of minor technical modifications in institutional design
(Chapter 7).
The book's initial focus on Australia is useful, and not only
because it has developed and refined all variants of preferential systems in national and subnational elections for almost a
century. As an ethnically diverse but not an ethnically divided
society (p. 25), it also serves as a controlled case for illustrating the advantages of preferential systems in achieving the
three centripetal objectives. The fascinating case of Papua
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New Guinea provides the clearest and strongest support for
AV. One of the world's most ethnically fragmented societies, Papua New Guinea used AV in three elections between
1964 and 1972 to mitigate conflicts through cross-ethnic vote
swapping negotiated by candidates who campaigned together
among each other's ethnic groups, seeking second-preference
votes on the correct calculation that rational voters would
give their first preference to candidates from their own ethnic groups. The adoption of "firstpast the post" (FPTP) after
independence in 1975 reinforced the advantage of AV, as the
new FPTP system created severe cross-ethnic coordination
problems, encouraging the entry of large numbers of candidates, with corresponding decline in winning vote ratios and
increase in election-induced ethnic violence. The 1998 assembly election in Northern Ireland, held under the terms of the
Good Friday Agreement, provides the clearest and strongest
support for STV. In that election, STV helped, through vote
transfers, to neutralize extremist sectarian parties and elect
pro-agreement, centrist parties from each side of the otherwise deeply divided ethnic cleavages.
Fiji and Sri Lanka, however, provide weak support for the
claimed effectiveness of preferential designs. In Fiji, where
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have roughly equal population ratios but are otherwise ethnically, economically,
and politically divided, the use of a partially engineered
AV system in one parliamentary election produced limited
preelectoral cross-ethnic vote-swapping agreements among
erstwhile "monoethnic" parties. But the election results undercut even these limited agreements. In Sri Lanka, the use of
SV in four presidential elections between 1982 and 1999 failed
to counteract the overwhelming Sinhalese population advantage (74%) over Tamils (18%) and Muslims (7%), leading
always to the election of Sinhalese candidates by an absolute
majority of first-preference votes. A number of factors related
to contextual variations and technical modifications in institutional design are adduced in an ad hoc manner to account
for these differences between institutional expectations and
electoral outcomes.
Beyond these major cases, the book also contains brief,
informative discussions of the failed attempts to adopt AV in
the United Kingdom, the one-time use of STV in Estonia's
transitional election in 1990, the potential advantage of AV
in the election of Bosnia-Herzegovina's tripartite presidency
(an option that was considered but not implemented for the
presidential elections there in October 2002), and the use of
various preferential systems in several subnational elections
in the United States and Canada.
The book does not systematically account for the mixed
results from the major cases, exposing the analytical weakness of the "electoral engineering" approach. For instance,
perhaps the most important insight of the book, which is
found only in the last few pages (pp. 185-192), concerns the
significance of two aspects of ethnic group demographics-fragmentation and concentration-in mediating the expected
impact of preferential designs. With respect to fragmentation, ethnically heterogeneous districts are considered to be
"the single most important demographic precondition for
centripetal strategies to work effectively" (p. 185). Group
concentration, on the other hand, creates ethnically homogeneous electoral districts, rendering the use of vote pooling
highly problematic.
Reilly wisely uses these demographic variations to caution against a cookie-cutter approach to electoral engineering. Curiously, however, he does not systematically examine
the implications of these variations in the case studies, even
though ethnically heterogeneous districts are commonplace
in Papua New Guinea and ethnically concentrated districts
presumably exist in Northern Ireland, the two cases that pro-
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vide unambiguous support for preferential systems. Also left
unexamined is the failure of AV to produce the expected results in Fiji, where the ethnic group demographic (dispersion
and geographic intermixing) is also considered favorable for
the effectiveness of the design (p. 187). Examination of these
issues requires a more rigorous analytical approach than allowed by the normative electoral engineering approach. It
especially requires the use of quantitative techniques such as
regression analysis to clarify the independent, additive, and
interactive effects of institutional design and context on electoral outcomes. The two approaches, however, are not mutually exclusive. Quantitative analysis provides the systematic
knowledge and understanding of the relative effects of institution and context that are necessary for realizing the prescriptive aspirations of the electoral engineering approach.
Reilly's book, therefore, does not close the debate on
the appropriate institutional design of electoral systems for
managing ethnic conflicts. But its coherent and convincing
arguments in favor of preferential systems, and especially
its coverage of heretofore unfamiliar and understudied cases
that have employed them, advance and enrich it.
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Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa is an insightful, refreshing, and original book that refines and expands our understanding of the so-called "politics of the belly." A phrase
made famous by Jean Francois Bayart (The State in Africa:
The Politics of the Belly, 1993), the politics of the belly is the
phenomenon of "eating" the fruits of power. The extent to
which officeholders monopolize or share these fruits with the
larger community has, however, significant consequences for
their legitimacy. As Michael Schatzberg suggests, a "moral
matrix of legitimate governance" (p. 35) embedded in familial and paternal metaphors shapes these belly politics.
In turn, he argues that the moral matrix is rooted in four
major premises. The first and second are related to the image of the ruler as a "fatherchief," who has the obligation,
on the one hand, to nurture and nourish his "family," and
on the other hand, to punish his "children" when necessary
and pardon them when they truly repent. The third premise
concerns the status of women in society; while they are not
considered equal to men, rulers should, nonetheless, respect
their role as "counselors and advisers." The fourth premise
"holds that permanent power is illegitimate and that political
fathers... have to let their children grow up, mature, take on
ever-increasing responsibilities in the conduct of their own
affairs, and eventually succeed them in power" (p. 192).
Governments that respect these four moral premises are
not necessarily democratic, but they enjoy legitimacy and
thus will endure; neither the ballot nor the bullet is likely to
overthrow them. When the "father-chief""eats" within limits
and guarantees his "family" access to food, while both knowing that his power is not eternal and listening to his "wives"
and "daughters,"he will win popular support. To that extent,
Africans will be satisfied with a regime that responds to their
own norms of accountability and legitimacy. These norms correspond to what Schatzberg calls "thinkability."Thinkability
is not simply "that which is politically thinkable" but is also,
in Schatzberg's eyes, legitimacy itself. Moreover, the author
contends, legitimacy can be apprehended through an exhaustive study of the "mainstream political discourse" (p. 32).
Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa seeks to uncover this
discourse by systematically examining daily state newspapers,

